The Interlocutory Appeal of
Class Certification:
Standards Developed in the
Federal Courts of Appeal
Kathleen R. Richards
I.
Introduction
Effective December 1, 1998, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was amended to include a new subdivision (f). This amendment provides litigants with a
method for instantly seeking appeal of class certification orders issued by a
district court. Prior to this amendment, an appeal of a district court order
granting or denying class certification was only available in very limited
circumstances if taken before final judgment was entered in the case.[1] However, subdivision (f) broadens these
circumstances:
Appeals. A court
of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district
court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.[2]
Subdivision
(f) was intended to expand the circumstances under which interlocutory appeal
of class certification orders would be permitted. As noted by the Committee:
An order denying certification may confront the
plaintiff with a situation in which the only sure path to appellate review is
by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual claim that,
standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation. An order granting certification, on the
other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.[3]
The Committee sought a
relatively “low cost” method of addressing these proportionality concerns, and
concluded that “establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power to
grant interlocutory review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification
issues”[4]
would constitute an appropriate solution.
Subdivision (f) itself articulates no parameters
for the exercise of discretion by the courts of appeals when permitting review
of orders granting or denying class certification. The courts of appeals are expected to “develop standards for
granting review that reflect the changing areas of uncertainty in class
litigation.”[5] In the nearly three years since Federal Rule
23(f) took effect, the courts of appeals of six federal circuits have published
opinions outlining the standards by which they will decide petitions for
interlocutory review of class certification orders. In those opinions, the courts have endorsed one of two basic
approaches. This article will analyze
each approach, discussing the focus for litigants who seek interlocutory review
of a certification order under either approach.
II.
The Two Basic Standards of Review
In developing standards for granting
interlocutory review of class certification orders, the courts of appeals have
adopted one of two basic approaches.
The first approach was originally espoused by the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. It sets forth two alternative bases, either of which is
sufficient for granting interlocutory review.
With some refinement, this approach has since been adopted by the First,
Second, and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals.[6] The second approach, utilizing a five-factor
“sliding scale” analysis, was originally developed by the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. That approach has
since been adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[7] The remaining circuits have not yet
published opinions articulating the standards they will use when reviewing
orders that grant or deny class certification.
A. The Alternative Bases
Standard
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was the
first appellate court to issue an opinion articulating the standards it would
use to review petitions for interlocutory appeal of class certification orders.
The standard set forth in Blair v.
Equifax Check Services, Inc.[8]
is termed the alternative bases standard.
Under this standard, interlocutory review of the certification order is
appropriate if the party seeking review can show that at least one of two
alternative bases applies to the class certification order at issue.
1. The Seventh
Circuit’s Decision in Blair
In Blair, the
Seventh Circuit delineated two alternative questions, at least one of which
required an affirmative response before that court would permit interlocutory
appeal of a district court order regarding class certification. The party seeking review would need to show
either that the order effectively sounded the “death knell” of the litigation,
or that an interlocutory appeal would facilitate development of the law.[9]
In the context of class action litigation, the term
“death knell” has been invoked to describe those orders of certification that
have the effect of terminating the litigation.[10] In other words, the “death knell” sounds
when an order similar to that described in the Advisory Committee Notes is
entered by the district court: if certification is denied, the remaining claim
is too small for the plaintiff to pursue through final judgment and appeal; if
certification is granted, the cost and risk are too great to warrant pursuing
the claim through final judgment and appeal.
The Seventh Circuit has specifically referred to the “death knell” in connection
with those cases in which class certification is denied and the plaintiff is
thereby precluded from pursuing the litigation further.[11] The Seventh Circuit has used the term
“mirror image of the death knell” to describe those cases in which class certification
is granted, and the defendant is thereby discouraged from pursuing the
litigation further.[12] For purposes of this article, cases
involving either the “death knell” or the mirror image of the “death knell”
will be included when discussing the “death knell doctrine.”
The Seventh Circuit in Blair determined that when the “death knell doctrine” is involved,
that is, when the class certification order would likely be fatal to continued
litigation, “a favorable exercise of appellate discretion is indicated.”[13] The court cautioned that the party who seeks
to review the class certification order under the “death knell doctrine” must
have “a solid argument in opposition to the district court’s decision.”[14] This requirement is reasonable. As the court stated, “if the ruling is
impervious to revision there’s no point to an interlocutory appeal.”[15] Further, the court cautioned that the
appellate courts should be “wary lest the mind hear a bell that is not
tolling.”[16] Therefore, interlocutory review of class
certification orders will be granted sparingly, even when a party asserts that
the “death knell doctrine” applies.[17]
Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit noted that “some
fundamental issues about class actions are poorly developed.”[18] If a party who seeks to review a class
certification order can demonstrate that an interlocutory appeal would
facilitate development of the law regarding class actions, then granting such
review would be consistent with the “reasons Rule 23(f) came into being.”[19] Thus, facilitation of developing law
constitutes the second basis for interlocutory review of a class certification
order. The Blair court commented that when the basis for the requested review
is the development of the law rather than the “death knell” doctrine, “it is
less important to show that the district judge’s decision is shaky.”[20] When
reviewing petitions on this ground, the appellate court will look to
whether the question of law at issue is fundamental and whether it is likely to
escape effective disposition at the end of the case, instead of looking to the
strength of the district judge’s decision.
However, even when invoking this ground, interlocutory appeal will be
granted only sparingly.
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on the
exceptional nature of interlocutory appeals, the court eschewed a “bright-line”
test or a test that focused on a “catalog of factors.”[21] Rather, the court looked to the purpose of
amended Rule 23(f) in setting forth the standard enunciated in Blair. This approach allows the court
flexibility to expand its standard for alternative bases of review, if
necessary, to remain consistent with developing law.
2. The Seventh Circuit
Standard as Adopted in Other Circuits
Following the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Blair, the appellate courts of other
circuits have likewise considered what standard to apply when reviewing
requests for interlocutory appeal of class certification orders. The Courts of Appeals for the First, Second,
and Third Circuits have adopted the alternative bases standard outlined in Blair, with some refinements.
The First Circuit was the first appellate court to
follow the Blair paradigm. In Waste
Management Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray,[22]
the First Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the discretionary
appellate jurisdiction permitted by Federal Rule 23(f) would be appropriately
exercised where the class certification order “effectively ends the case” or
where interlocutory review would “lead to clarification of a fundamental issue
of law.”[23] However, the First Circuit expressed concern
that the “clarification of a fundamental issue of law” basis might “encourage
too many disappointed litigants to file fruitless Rule 23(f) applications.”[24] Apparently, that court was not convinced
that the Seventh Circuit restriction, applying the standard only to legal
issues that are “fundamental” and likely to “escape effective disposition” if
left until the end of the case, was sufficient to discourage disappointed
litigants.[25]
Accordingly, the First Circuit not only incorporated
both of the Seventh Circuit’s restrictions on the second basis of review as
noted above, it also added a further restriction. The First Circuit additionally requires that a party seeking
review of a class certification order on the basis that a fundamental question
of law is involved must also show that it is “an unsettled legal issue that is
important to the particular litigation as well as important in itself.”[26] This refinement thus adds the requirement
that the issue of law be important to the case at hand. In Blair,
the Seventh Circuit had only required that the issue of law be relevant to the
undeveloped law regarding class action.[27] Finally, like the Seventh Circuit, the First
Circuit has emphasized that granting interlocutory appeal of a class certification
order is discretionary; it has cautioned that “we intend to exercise our
discretion judiciously.”[28]
In Newton v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,[29] the Third Circuit followed suit, adopting
the Blair standard of review as
well. The Third Circuit reviewed
existing case law and found that Blair
and Waste Management Holdings
together provided “a useful template for courts to work from when evaluating
petitions under Rule 23(f).”[30] The court emphasized that granting
interlocutory appeal of a class certification order would be appropriate when
such review would permit the appellate court to address “the possible
case-ending effect of an order,” correct an erroneous order, or “facilitate
development of the law on class certification.” The court noted, however, that these circumstances were not
exclusive.[31]
Interlocutory appellate review of a class certification order might also be
appropriate for “other valid reasons.”
The court did not intend to circumscribe its discretion by adopting the alternative
bases standard of review as articulated in Blair
and Waste Management Holdings.[32] The court particularly noted that the
Advisory Committee Notes afforded wide latitude to appellate courts when
determining which interlocutory appeals would be heard. It further agreed with
the Seventh Circuit that this standard could not be measured by a “bright-line”
test.[33]
In the case of Sumitomo
Copper Litigation v. Credit Lyonnias Rouse, Ltd.,[34]
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit combined the Blair standard of review with the refinements and qualifications
articulated in Waste Management Holdings
and Newton. Although the court there adopted the Seventh Circuit’s
alternative bases of review standard, it agreed with the Third Circuit and
refused to circumscribe its discretion: “we leave open the possibility that a
petition failing to satisfy either of the foregoing requirements may
nevertheless be granted where it presents special circumstances that militate
in favor of an immediate appeal.”[35] Under this determination, the possibility
remains that interlocutory review of a class certification order might be
available in extraordinary circumstances, even if the “death knell” has not
sounded or a fundamental question of law is not at issue.
Notwithstanding this growing consensus, some courts
have chosen another paradigm for granting interlocutory appeals under amended
Rule 23(f). The courts of at least two circuits have instead adopted a
five-factor “sliding scale” test.
Although this test has some features in common with the alternative
bases standard, it requires a more extensive examination of the petition for
review. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit first promulgated this “sliding-scale” test in Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush.[36]
1. The Eleventh
Circuit’s Five-Factor “Sliding Scale” Test
When creating its five-factor test in Prado-Steiman, the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed the Advisory Committee Notes, Blair,
and Waste Management Holdings. It concluded, however, that while Blair and Waste Management
Holdings were “cogent explications” of the Rule 23(f) inquiry, additional
factors should be considered.[37] Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit observed
that powerful case management concerns mitigated against granting numerous
petitions for interlocutory appellate review of class certification orders.[38] Accordingly, the court concluded that
instead of applying the Seventh Circuit’s alternative bases of review standard,
it should use five “guideposts” in deciding whether to grant interlocutory
appellate review.[39]
The five “guideposts,” or factors that comprise this
test, were adopted in the following order: (1) whether the class certification
order is a “death knell order;” (2) whether the party seeking review has shown
“a substantial weakness in the class
certification decision;” (3) whether the review would “permit the resolution of
an unsettled legal issue that is important to the particular litigation as well
as important in itself;” (4) the “nature and status of the litigation before
the district court;” and (5) the “likelihood that future events may make
immediate appellate review more or less appropriate.”[40] While some overlap is evident between the
five-factor test and the alternative bases standard enunciated by the Seventh
Circuit, the five-factor test offers additional items for consideration. Furthermore, this test offers a new paradigm
that balances each of the factors against the others.
It is apparent, for example, that the first
consideration noted above (whether the class certification order sounds a
“death knell” in the litigation) is identical to the first potential basis for
review under Blair. On the other
hand, the second factor noted above (whether the party seeking review has shown
a substantial weakness in the certification decision) is not a basis for review
under Blair. Rather, it is a burden placed upon the party
seeking review under the “death knell” doctrine in Blair. The third factor (whether an unsettled legal issue is
involved) is identical to the second possible basis for review in Blair, but it refines Waste Management Holdings, which
required that the unsettled legal issue be important by itself and in the
particular litigation at issue.[41]
The fourth and fifth factors enumerated by the
five-factor test, however, constitute new elements. Neither the nature or status of the litigation, nor the effect of
future events on the propriety of appellate review, were considered by any of
the Blair progeny. With respect to the fourth factor, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that the “nature and status of the litigation before
the district court” involved considering whether the pre-trial posture of the
case in district court favorably
situated the case for interlocutory appellate review.[42] Finally, the fifth factor, the “likelihood
that future events may make immediate appellate review more or less
appropriate,” required consideration of other relevant circumstances: whether
the prospect of imminent change in the status of the litigation by settlement,
the status of a party in bankruptcy, or other changes made it more or less
appropriate to review the class certification order during the pendency of the
underlying litigation.[43]
Beyond adding these two factors, the Eleventh Circuit
decided that the five factors were not intended to be exhaustive, but it would
exercise discretionary review with restraint.[44] As noted, the five factors must be balanced
against one another, accounting for any unique facts or circumstances. The
court emphasized that in balancing these factors against one another,
particular attention should be accorded the second factor: whether the party
seeking review has shown a substantial weakness in the class certification
decision. This factor in particular
would be weighed on a “sliding scale.”[45] The stronger the showing of weakness in the
certification decision, the greater the weight accorded this factor when
deciding to grant interlocutory appellate review.
2.
The Eleventh Circuit’s Five-Factor “Sliding Scale” Test as Adopted in Other
Circuits
The five-factor “sliding scale” test delineated by the
Eleventh Circuit has been adopted only by one other appellate court. In Lienhart
v. Dryvit Systems, Inc.[46]
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Eleventh Circuit rationale in Prado-Steiman. It agreed that
consideration of all five factors was appropriate in reviewing a
petition for interlocutory appeal of a class certification order. In addition, the Fourth Circuit clearly
focused the “sliding scale” nature of the second factor in the Eleventh Circuit
test:
Where a district
court’s certification decision is manifestly erroneous and virtually certain to
be reversed on appeal, the issues involved need not be of general importance,
nor must the certification decision constitute a “death knell” for the litigation. . . . The weakness of the district court’s certification, viewed in
terms of the likelihood of reversal under an abuse of discretion standard,
operates on a “sliding scale” in conjunction with the other factors enumerated
by the Eleventh Circuit in Prado-Steiman.[47]
In
other words, where the class certification decision is clearly wrong, the
remaining four factors of the Eleventh Circuit’s test assume minimal
importance. Thus, by adopting the
five-factor “sliding scale” test the appellate courts of the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits retain greater flexibility when reviewing petitions for
interlocutory appeal of class certification orders, as compared to the Blair progeny. However, all courts have adopted a similar caution: the power of
interlocutory review will be exercised frugally.
As earlier noted, despite the express purpose of the
amendment to Federal Rule 23, each of the appellate courts has developed a standard
of review for petitions seeking interlocutory appeal of class certification
orders that limits the prospects for such review. However, under either standard for obtaining review, there is one
constant: litigants are more likely to succeed in obtaining review if they
focus their arguments on the questionable legal nature of the district court’s
order of certification. In other words,
those litigants who have successfully obtained interlocutory review of certification
orders have generally obtained that review by directly challenging the legal
sufficiency of the court’s order of certification. This strategy predominates the focus on other issues, such as the
terminal nature of the order of certification, the unsettled nature of class
action law, or the nature and status of the litigation pending before the
district court. In effect, the
appellate courts are reviewing the merits of the appeal in order to decide
whether to accept the appeal.
Consequently, litigants who brief a request for interlocutory review
should argue not only for review of the order, but also the merits of the
appeal.
The alternative bases standard would require litigants
who challenge class certification either to apply the “death knell doctrine” or
demonstrate the existence of a fundamental issue of law affecting class
actions. Those who attempt to apply the “death knell doctrine” would need to
demonstrate that the certification order increases the costs and risks
associated with the litigation to a point that the party cannot risk pursuing
the case through judgment and appeal.
Further, the party must also show that the certification order is
“questionable” under the “death knell doctrine.”[48] Therefore, even where the appellate court
accepts that an order granting class certification will raise the stakes to the
point of unacceptable risk, the challenge to the certification order can
nevertheless fail if the litigant has not demonstrated the “questionable”
nature of the court’s certification order.
The principal focus of the appellate court’s inquiry
will be the legal sufficiency of the district court’s certification order. For example, in Sumitomo Copper Litigation, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit accepted the defendant-appellants’ assertion that “class certification
will effectively terminate the litigation.”[49] The court held, however, that “a death knell
review is not warranted because petitioners have failed to make a substantial
showing that the district court’s decision to grant certification is
questionable.”[50] The court of appeals found that the district
court had made sufficient specific findings to support certification; it then
found that the other issues raised by the defendant related to the
manageability of the class action. The court recognized that the district court
could have altered the certification order if necessary to address the issues
of manageability. Therefore, it denied
the defendant’s request for interlocutory appeal of the certification order.
The bottom line was the defendant’s failure to show that the certification
order was legally insufficient.
A similar but expanded rationale prevailed in Waste Management Holdings. The
defendant-appellant there petitioned for interlocutory review based on the
“death knell doctrine.” The First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to meet the required
standard for “death knell” review, but it granted the defendant’s application
for interlocutory review, noting that appeal would provide the district court
“a better sense as to which aspects of the class certification decision might
reasonably be open to subsequent reconsideration.”[51] The First Circuit considered this
opportunity to resolve uncertainty in the district court’s certification order
a sufficient basis for granting interlocutory review. Again, as the Second Circuit emphasized in Sumitomo, appellate courts will focus on the legal sufficiency of
the district court’s class certification order in deciding whether to permit
interlocutory appeal.
A defendant seeking interlocutory review under the
five-factor “sliding scale” standard must demonstrate that the class
certification order would terminate the litigation, that the order contains a
substantial weakness, that the order involves an unsettled question of law,
that the nature and status of the litigation is properly subject to
interlocutory review, or that immediate appellate review would appropriately
respond to upcoming events.[52] In practice, however, the appellate courts
once again have focused on the legal sufficiency of the district court’s
certification order.
For example, in Prado-Steiman,
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the certification
order did not necessarily sound the “death knell” for litigation, and that the
defendant-appellant had not necessarily met the other factors of the “sliding
scale” test. Nonetheless, the court
granted the request for interlocutory review. The appellate court focused on
the importance of the lawsuit, combined with the opportunity “to address
certain aspects of the class certification ruling -- particularly with respect
to the creation of subclasses and typicality review.”[53] This reasoning approximates the First Circuit’s
rationale in Waste Management Holdings. The appellate court there used the
interlocutory review process to advise district courts when addressing
questionable orders or interpretations of law affecting the merits of
certification.
The Eleventh Circuit specifically noted that “the
merits of this appeal have already been briefed” in its decision to permit
interlocutory review.[54] Similarly, when granting interlocutory
review under the five-factor “sliding scale” test, the Fourth Circuit noted
that the application for interlocutory review “of necessity [had] led to an
extensive examination of the merits of class certification.”[55] Thus, these appellate courts have made it
abundantly clear that a defendant who seeks interlocutory review of a class
certification order should thoroughly brief the merits of the appeal when
briefing the issue of review.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule 23(f)
indicate that the amendment was intended to increase appellate court oversight
of class certification orders issued by the district courts. By providing a vehicle for discretionary
review of such orders, the amendment created an opportunity for parties to
challenge a certification order that threatened to terminate the
litigation. In practice, however, the
appellate courts clearly intend to limit the exercise of this opportunity. As a result, it is crucial for any defendant
who seeks interlocutory review of a class certification order to focus on those
arguments that are most persuasive to the appellate courts. In this regard, the appellate courts appear
to focus more closely on the legal sufficiency of the district court’s
certification order, making it essential for defendants to thoroughly brief the
merits of their challenge to certification as part of the petition for
interlocutory review.
ENDNOTES
[1] Interlocutory appeal of district
court orders granting or denying class certification had occasionally been
sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which provides for permissive interlocutory
appeal if the district judge certifies that the order involves a controlling
question of law. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
1996); In re School Asbestos
Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852
(1986). Interlocutory appeal had also
been sought by requesting that a writ of mandamus issue under 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a), which requires a showing that the district judge clearly violated his
or her authority. See, e.g., Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Grady v.
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 516 U.S. 867 (1995). Both of these avenues required extraordinary showings by the
party seeking interlocutory appeal; consequently, they were rarely invoked.
[2] Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(f) (1998).
[3] Advisory Committee Notes, 1998
Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
(f) (1998).
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] This approach is used in the federal
courts of Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
Vermont and Wisconsin.
[7] This approach is used in the federal
courts of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia and West Virginia.
[8] 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999).
[9] Id.
at 834-35.
[10] See,
e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Michelson v.
Citicorp Nat’l. Services, Inc., 138 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1998); Sherri A.D. v.
Kirby, 975 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1992).
[11] Blair,
181 F.3d at 834.
[12] Id.
at 835.
[13] Id.
at 834.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
at 835.
[16] Id.
at 834.
[17] This is interesting in light of the
Advisory Committee’s purpose in amending Rule 23, to expand the circumstances
in which interlocutory appellate review of certification orders was
available. However, the Seventh
Circuit’s circumspection in granting review has been echoed by all the other
appellate courts which have considered this issue.
[18] Blair,
181 F.3d at 835.
[19] Id.
at 834.
[20] Id.
at 835.
[21] Id.
at 834.
[22] 208 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2000).
[23] Id.
at 293.
[24] Id.
at 293-94.
[25] Blair,
181 F.3d at 835.
[26] Waste
Management Holdings, 208 F.3d at 294.
[27] Blair,
181 F.3d at 835.
[28] Waste
Management Holdings, 208 F.3d at 294.
[29] 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001).
[30] Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2001).
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
at 165.
[34] 262 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2001).
[35] Id.
at 140.
[36] 221 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).
[37] Id.
at 1273.
[38] This is noteworthy given the purposes
of the amendment to Federal Rule 23, but wholly consistent with the opinions of
other appellate courts on this issue.
[39] Prado-Steiman,
221 F.3d at 1274-76.
[40] Id.
[41] Compare
Blair, 181 F.3d at 835, with Waste
Management Holdings, 208 F.3d at 294.
[42] Prado-Steiman,
221 F.3d at 1276.
[43] Id.
[44] Id.
at 1276-77.
[45] Id.
at 1275 n.10.
[46] 255 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2001).
[47] Id.
at 145.
[48] See
Sumitomo, 262 F.3d 134; Blair,
181 F.3d at 834.
[49] Sumitomo,
262 F.3d at 140.
[50] Id.
[51] Waste
Management Holdings, 208 F.3d at 295.
[52] See
Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).
[53] Id.
at 1278.
[54] Id.
[55] Lienhart v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 255
F.3d 138, 146 (4th Cir. 2001).
(author’s bio)
Ms. Richards is a shareholder in the
firm of Sandberg, Phoenix and von Gontard in St. Louis, Missouri. She concentrates her practice in civil
litigation, including the representation of defendants in complex class action
litigation, and is also active in health care law, representing clients in the
defense of medical malpractice claims and ERISA litigation. Ms. Richards
received her J.D. with honors in 1989 from IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, and
served as a judicial law clerk to the Hon. Howell Cobb, U.S. District Judge for
the Eastern District of Texas. She is
licensed to practice in Missouri, Illinois and Texas, the Southern District of
Illinois and all federal courts in Missouri and Texas.